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Monday, 16 November 2026

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Boris Vujčić: Risks and resilience in the euro area financial system

Policy desk, National Trade News (2026-11-16): SPEECH Risks and resilience in the euro area financial system Keynote speech by Boris Vujčić, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Euro Finance Week It is my… Primary source: original at ECB (ecb.europa.eu).

· ECB

  • SPEECH
Risks and resilience in the euro area financial system

Keynote speech by Boris Vujčić, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Euro Finance Week

It is my great pleasure to open this year's Frankfurt Euro Finance Week. This event provides a timely opportunity to reflect on the state of the euro area financial system and the challenges ahead. It also comes just two days before the ECB publishes its latest Financial Stability Review (FSR). My key message today is that Europe needs more market-based finance. At the same time, however, a larger role for non-banks must go hand in hand with stronger system-wide safeguards.

While most risks identified in the FSR have been on our radar for quite some time, two stand out very prominently compared to the situation a year ago. These relate to developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and sovereign debt markets.

In our assessment a year ago, AI-related vulnerabilities were fundamentally associated with stretched valuations in global stock markets and the risk that market sentiment could shift abruptly. At present however, while the risk of market repricing, rather than abating, has further increased, AI-related risks to system-wide stability now stem from a range of additional factors – the expansion of external funding from equity to debt markets, concentration of exposures, quickening AI adoption and potential cyberattacks.

In fact, rapid advances in AI models’ cyber capabilities raise risks that have systemic implications. So too does the high concentration of third-party providers of critical services (notably of information and communications technology systems) on which euro area banks and financial intermediaries rely. An early-release FSR special feature published today explores this further.

Concerns about sovereign debt sustainability have been present throughout recent years, reflecting elevated public debt levels and persistently weak fiscal fundamentals in some euro area countries. Sovereign debt fragilities have further increased on both sides of the Atlantic, and are among the factors driving up long-term yields. The risk of global spillovers has also increased. Risks are compounded by inflation concerns, a notable rise in debt issuance by hyperscalers, growing government financing needs, a more price-sensitive investor base, heightened policy and geopolitical uncertainty, and longer-term structural challenges.

Turning to economic activity, over the past year, the euro area economy has proven remarkably resilient in the face of multiple challenges. Economic growth continued to expand in the third quarter of this year, although less dynamically than in the previous quarter.

But the ongoing war in the Middle East continues to push energy prices up, leading to high energy inflation. At the same time, trade policy uncertainty has not abated significantly. Headline inflation in the euro area increased to 4% in October, from 3.8% in September, mainly due to higher energy prices. Underlying inflation has remained broadly stable and wages are not showing a material response at this stage. Overall, recent energy price developments may push inflation higher, while weaker confidence and rising borrowing costs should partially contain this by weighing on growth.

The adverse impact of the energy shock on economic growth has been partly offset by an upbeat AI narrative. But the market correction following the US mid-term elections earlier this month, although contained, serves as a reminder to remain cautious about AI valuations.

Key risks to stability of the euro area financial system

Three developments and related sources of risk and vulnerability for euro area financial stability stand out.

First, artificial intelligence. The rapid expansion of AI is creating new challenges for financial stability. Growing debt and equity exposures to AI-linked firms are raising concerns about market concentration, overly optimistic earnings expectations and potential credit risks.

The scale of firms’ financing needs across the AI supply chain is unprecedented. Large cloud and AI infrastructure providers are increasingly turning to debt markets, with issuance volumes reaching record highs this year. Borrowing is likely to increase further, as cumulative capital expenditure by major US technology firms is projected to reach USD 5.5 trillion by 2030.

At the same time, firms are increasingly relying on opaque off-balance-sheet financing structures and circular financial arrangements to fund AI infrastructure investment. For example, chipmakers and cloud providers may invest in AI labs that, in turn, commit to purchasing their hardware and services.

Equity issuance is also surging, with IPO volumes now on track to exceed the dot-com bubble high, relative to US GDP. Historically, such surges have often coincided with market peaks, pointing to the risk of excessive investor optimism. This is concerning given that, while current market valuations rest on expectations of extraordinary earnings growth, the outlook remains highly uncertain.

Undoubtedly, the growing adoption of AI across the financial sector offers significant opportunities for efficiency gains. But it also introduces new vulnerabilities, including greater dependence on a small number of technology providers and heightened cyber and operational risks.

In particular, increasingly capable and autonomous AI systems are magnifying the scale, speed and sophistication of cyberattacks. Social engineering attacks are also becoming more effective. At least in the near term, this may shift the balance in favour of attackers, as financial institutions may face higher costs and greater constraints in deploying AI for defence.

In response, ECB Banking Supervision has called on banks to strengthen their cyber defences, accelerate efforts to address vulnerabilities, and adapt their risk management frameworks to the rapidly evolving threat of cyberattacks.

The second development relates to fiscal pressures. A challenging fiscal outlook could test investor confidence and lead to a repricing of sovereign risk. Sovereign debt levels are elevated in several euro area countries and major advanced economies, where growing concerns about debt sustainability have already led to a sharp rise in long-term sovereign yields. In the euro area specifically, higher borrowing costs and structural headwinds that hinder potential growth could further strain fiscal positions and rekindle concerns in highly indebted countries.

Higher issuance needs and a shift toward a more price-sensitive investor base also add to sovereign risks. The ability of the investor base to absorb additional supply will be key to ensuring the orderly functioning of sovereign bond markets. Hedge funds have become a significant but procyclical source of liquidity, while large Japanese investors may further reduce euro area government bond holdings if Japanese yields rise. At the same time, the substantial financing needs associated with the AI investment boom raise questions about potential competition for capital between public and private borrowers, including whether AI-related debt issuance could put upward pressure on financing costs or crowd out other investment.

The third development concerns the non-bank financial sector. The steadily growing share of non-bank financial intermediation offers opportunities to diversify sources of financing and support economic growth. While banks remain closely interconnected with the non-bank financial sector, the structural transformation of the financial system is changing how shocks are transmitted and amplified.

Private credit and private equity funds are playing an increasingly important role in financing the build-out of AI infrastructure, adding to concerns about leverage, opacity and interconnectedness across the financial system.

Euro area investment funds have significantly increased their exposures to AI in recent years, through both equities and debt securities. A reassessment of the AI narrative may trigger an abrupt repricing in markets and significant valuation losses. This could lead to a surge in investment fund redemptions, increasing the risk of forced asset sales, with the interplay of rising portfolio concentration and leverage potentially amplifying market stress.

The growing footprint of leveraged hedge funds in sovereign bond markets creates additional vulnerabilities.

Risks in the non-bank financial sector are thus closely linked to developments in AI and sovereign debt markets. The potential for these risks to materialise simultaneously could lead to losses and liquidity pressures in one market spilling over into others, amplifying risks to financial stability.

Enhancing resilience in the non-bank financial sector

Against a backdrop of geopolitical headwinds and elevated financial stability risks, preserving the resilience of the euro area banking sector remains essential. Banks have maintained strong capital and liquidity positions, supported by solid profitability and retained earnings. Current regulatory capital buffers do not appear to be a binding constraint on lending. Instead, they provide important safeguards and should be preserved as insurance against future shocks.

The picture of resilience is more mixed across the non-bank financial sector.

Non-bank and market-based finance is playing an increasingly important role in financing the euro area economy, which is a welcome development. Deeper and more integrated European capital markets can broaden financing opportunities for firms, support investment and improve risk-sharing across the financial system. Advancing the savings and investments union is an important priority for Economic and Monetary Union.

But as non-bank financial intermediation grows, we also need to ensure that the policy framework keeps pace with the risks. While the banking sector is subject to a well-established macroprudential framework, the tools available to address systemic risks in the non-bank financial sector remain limited. Without enhanced EU-level supervision and a system-wide approach to non-bank finance, vulnerabilities may build up in the sector, amplifying market-wide shocks and potentially spilling over to the banking sector.

Of course, non-bank finance is highly diverse, and risks are not evenly distributed across institutions and business models. Our main concern is with the activities and intermediaries that contribute to the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities, particularly through excessive leverage, liquidity mismatches and interconnectedness with banks.

Leveraged trading strategies in core financial markets, including sovereign bond and repo markets, can support market liquidity in normal times. But a rapid unwinding of these positions during periods of stress can amplify that stress and disrupt markets that are normally very liquid.

Similarly, private credit can diversify financing sources for firms. While risks currently appear contained, the rapid growth of private credit warrants close monitoring, given limited transparency, growing interconnectedness with banks and insurers, and potential liquidity mismatches.

These developments underscore the need to strengthen the policy frameworks for non-banks and enhance their resilience to system-wide shocks.

For investment funds, this means addressing structural liquidity mismatches by better aligning redemption terms with the liquidity of underlying assets.

For money market funds, it is about strengthening liquidity buffers, which should be raised and made more usable in times of stress.

And for hedge funds, it entails considering leverage limits, minimum margins or haircut requirements for securities financing transactions to address the risks of excessive leverage.

Furthermore, efforts to improve liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls should be stepped up across a wide range of non-bank market participants.

Finally, closing data gaps and improving data-sharing are essential to better identify and address systemic risks. Given the global nature of the hedge fund industry and the prominent role of offshore financial centres, effective risk monitoring requires stronger cross-border information-sharing arrangements. This has been on the international policy agenda for some time, but progress has been slow. Close international cooperation, notably through the Financial Stability Board, is needed to develop consistent policy approaches and support their effective implementation across jurisdictions.

Ultimately, our objective is to foster a resilient non-bank financial sector that can support Europe's financing needs while safeguarding financial stability. Achieving this requires a regulatory framework that addresses systemic risks consistently across the financial system, while recognising the different business models of banks and non-banks and taking into account the broader systemic implications of their activities.

European Central Bank

Directorate General Communications

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